Given the vast number of influences on corporate performance, such as the numerous characteristics of the board of directors, there is an abundant literature on the determinants of performance. Thus, this paper tries to bring together this diverse body of knowledge into a coherent whole.
Introduction
Although the need to improve and develop new control mechanisms to minimize the dangers associated with the potential conflicts of interests between corporate stakeholders has long been advocated, large-scale financial scandals and, in particular, the financial crisis have brought into the public domain the issue of the weak corporate governance. This has been the particular and notorious case of the banking sector. The importance of banks in the economy and the nature of their activity, 1 as well as the significant costs that the failures in bank governance can cause, 2 make the analysis of the governance mechanisms in the banking sector simultaneously highly specific and important. Moreover, banks also have specific governance issues. 3 In other words, banks clearly appear to have distinct governance structures than non-financial firms. 4 
"For financial institutions, the scope of corporate governance goes beyond the shareholders (equity governance) to include debtholders, insurance policy holders and other creditors (debt governance)."

5(p.219)
Many renowned academics, economists, public authorities and several other observers have argued that poor corporate governance contributed to, or even caused, the collapse of an impressive number of large banks throughout the world. Corporate governance is generally defined as the set of mechanisms for addressing agency problems and controlling risk within the firm and so, it is not surprising that the importance of the effectiveness of corporate practices in the banking sector has been much emphasised. For the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 6(p10) During the financial crisis the quality of governance gained significantly more relevance especially concerning the quality of the board of banks. In fact, boards are one of the most important, arguably even the most important, corporate governance mechanisms that fulfil the following roles: (1) monitor and evaluate managementsupervisory role, (2) make managerial decisions such as which projects to undertake financial firms are one of the main causes of the financial crisis, evidencing that boards failed to set up appropriate risk strategies and establish suitable metrics to monitor its implementation in a timely and effective manner. 17 For Francis et al 18 (p.40) "although weak corporate boards may not be the direct trigger of the current crisis, corporate board practices could affect the extent to which firms are vulnerable to the financial crisis." To address fundamental deficiencies in bank corporate governance that became apparent during the financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 19 has issued a final set of principles for enhancing sound corporate governance practices at banking organisations in a document titled "Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance" in which the board is identified as a vital part of banks' regulatory reforms. It has undoubtedly never been as vital to understand the governance of banks and their boards as it is now in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
The existing literature on the relationship between corporate boards and performance shows mixed results. One reason commonly cited for the inconclusive results is that a significant number of these studies fail to account for the endogeneity issue that emerges from the joint determination of board structure and the value of the firm. 20 "Endogeneity leads to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates that make reliable inference virtually impossible." 21(p6) Thus, the findings of the studies that examine the board structure-performance relationship must be analysed with caution if the empirical methods do not appropriately control for all relevant sources of endogeneity. (22) Moreover, the uniqueness of bank governance suggests that the i Complex firms such as those that operate in multiple segments, are large in size, or have high leverage are likely to have greater advising requirements. 7 effects of boards on bank performance may be different from their effects on nonfinancial firms and, thus, worthy of special attention. 23 By surveying the existing literature the main conclusion is that some of the regularities found in the research on the relation between corporate governance and performance of non-financial firms do not hold for banks, as is the case of board independence and board size (e.g., Pathan and Faff, 2 Adams 24 and Erkens et al 25 ) .
Thus, recommendations on the corporate governance made to other sectors can be counterproductive in the banking sector. In addition, we can also infer the following:
First, although when dealing with board effectiveness most studies exclude financial firms from their sample, 4 , ii in more recent years, banks and financial institutions have been more closely examined and the question of whether better bank governance (especially concerning boards) leads to improved bank performance has been increased analysed by the literature.
iii This research is very relevant. In fact, better knowledge on how corporate governance of banks impacts on their performance is extremely important as in has policy implications not only at banklevel (e.g., bank management and shareholders) but also at country-level (e.g., regulators, regarding the development and improvement of corporate governance codes and best practices recommendations).
Second, the European context is sparsely analysed by the literature when compared to the United States (US) context, being even more scarce the existence of European cross-country studies.
Third, empirical research analysed the relationship between different corporate governance mechanisms and bank performance using distinct measures of performance:
 Stock returns;  Return on Equity (ROE); 23, 29, 31, 37, [39] [40] [41] [42] [43]  Return on Assets (ROA); 1, 4, 29, 30, 37, 38, [40] [41] [42] [43] [44]  Accounting earnings;
28 ii For surveys relating to corporate governance in non-financial firms see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny 26 and Adams et al. 15 iii Likewise, for de Haan and Vlahu 27(p2) although "because of the special nature of financial services, most academic papers on corporate governance exclude financial firms from their data and focus on non-financial firms", there is a substantial, but scattered, research on governance of financial institutions, which contrast to the claim by Adams and Mehran. Fourth, the impact of board characteristics on bank performance depends on the trade-off between the advantages and disadvantages of the monitoring and advising roles, the two primary roles performed by the board of directors.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines corporate governance and its different perspectives and, briefly, discusses why it should matter. Section 3 describes the special features of banks and their implications for corporate governance. Section 4 discusses the literature on the relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors and bank performance. Although this survey focus on banks, occasionally relevant evidence on other financial institutions and nonfinancial firms will be discussed, namely for reasons of comparison. Section 5 iv CAMELS is an acronym for capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to market risk.
presents a short analysis, due to the scarcity of research to date, of the influence of board characteristics on bank failures. Section 6 provides the major conclusions. shareholder stakeholders than boards of non-financial firms. Regulators, for instance, expect boards to act to guarantee the safety and soundness of the banks, a goal that may not necessarily be in shareholders' best interest. 24 The weak corporate governance in the banking industry is often identified as one of the causes of the global financial crisis 63 or even its major cause. 17 First, banks are generally more opaque than non-financial firms and their activity is more complex. The quality of bank loans as well as the quality of other bank' assets are not readily observable, which makes it difficult to accurately assess the risks they bear. 61, 67, 70, 74 Also, the complexity of several financial instruments makes it more difficult to measure and evalute risks. 68, 70 During the financial crisis, for example, the risk associated with many financial innovations, such as securitized products, were not properly understood and managed (e.g., Dell'Ariccia et al 75 and
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Carlin et al 76 ) . Additionally, the competition among rating agencies for corporate customers do not lead to an unbiased assessment of risks as needed by investors. 77 To worsen this situation, in recent years rating agencies have had to evaluate new and complex financial assets for which there existed no record of historical data and no appropriate models of risk quantification (see, Buiter 78 Second, banks are highly leveraged institutions. 3, 12, 61, [80] [81] [82] This high leverage raises the probability of bank failures 61, 73 and depositors as well as other debtholders will demand a higher risk premium as compensation for the higher risk of insolvency. 61 Additionally, in the presence of high leverage the conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholders interacts with the equity governance in banks. 73 Depositors are the primary claimholders 80 in banks, and their interest might differ significantly. 73 High leverage of banking firms and regulation may also affect the ability of external governance mechanisms to solve the governance problems of these firms. 12 failure." Thus, well-governed banks are important to the stability of the entire financial system. To achieve its goals, the regulator might impose restrictions on the banking business such as: (1) 66 Hostile takeovers might discipline managers' behaviour because they increase the threat of managers being removed due to poor performance.
x The threat of potential hostile takeovers induces managers to act in the best interest of shareholders to avoid being fired (in a takeover). 89, 90 However, the imposition, by regulators, of several restrictions on the banking system lowers the frequency of hostile takeovers and makes these insufficient to discipline bank managers, decreasing the efficiency of the market for corporate control. 67, 69 Regulation as well as valuation difficulties also weaken the potential role of the market for corporate control. 3 In addition, regulators might pursue their own interests as a regulator (e.g., Boot and Thakor 91 ).
ix Regulation might also be an additional external governance force that acts at the macroeconomic level -in the banking sector as a whole -and at the microeconomic level -in the individual banks sphere. 87 For example, as part of their efforts to monitor banks, regulators supervise the functioning of bank boards. size can also exacerbate important moral hazard problems (the issue known as "toobig-to-fail").
In short, on the one hand, banks have specific governance issues, distinct from those of non-financial firms, whereas on the other hand, the board of a bank plays a critical role in achieving effective governance. 2 In the distinct context that involves the bank´s activities, the board is a key element in its governance structure. 1, 12, 57, 61, 66 xi Deposit insurance is a means to discourage withdrawals of deposits and short-term funding from banks that would otherwise be solvent. 
Characteristics of the board of directors and bank performance
The relevance of the role of the board of directors has been highlighted by abundant literature, media and public debates. Mizruchi 92(p433) to the advising function because they have more firm-specific knowledge, critical to mitigating problems arising from information asymmetry between the board and management. Thus, the effect of board characteristics on performance depends on which of the two main roles is more relevant for firms, regarding a specific attribute of the board, or, to put it in another way, on the needs of firms for advising vis-à-vis monitoring (and vice-versa).
The board of directors is thus at the centre of the public discussion regarding corporate governance reform, in particular concerning how board characteristics contribute to performance. Next, we review the literature on the relationship between a large number of board attributes and bank performance. 24(p32) In comparing board independence between banks and non-financial firms, both in the xiv A potential disadvantage of outside directors is that they may lack relevant firm-specific information.
Board independence and performance
14 xv A higher standard of responsibility, requirement and obligations for the board of banks as well a set of regulation restrictions, imposed by regulators to ensure the health of the financial system, may, eventually, to make it difficult to attract and retain talented directors. 12 perform worse. This finding holds during the crisis period. Also, they present evidence that the impact of board structure (board independence, board size and gender diversity) is prevalent particularly for banks with low market power, exposed to external takeovers and/or of smaller size. The negative impact of board independence on performance is confirmed during the financial crisis for financial firms. Erkens et al, 25 using a dataset of 296 financial firms from 30 countries, find that firms with more independent directors experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period.
xvi Accordingly, Adams 24 shows that banks receiving bailout money, in xvi The explanation for this result is that independent board members may incentive managers to raise particular TARP funds, had boards that were more independent than in other banks.
Similarly, Minton et al 35 find that a more independent board is associated with increases in the likelihood of receiving TARP funds. This suggests that board independence may not necessarily be beneficial for banks because independent directors may not have sufficient expertise to monitor complex banking firms and oversee the actions of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). 24 In the crisis period, Aebi et al, 31 
Board size and performance
An extensive literature analyses board size in banks comparing it with board size in non-financial firms and examining whether and how it matters for bank performance. Several studies report that banks have larger boards than non-financial firms. 12 
CEO duality and performance
It has long been argued that when the CEO is also the Chairman xviii the motivation of the board to monitor and oversee management is compromised due to a lack of independence and conflicts of interests, 90 reducing the board's ability to ensure that management pursues the development of activities that create value.
Supporters of the separation between the roles of CEO and Chairman argue that when the CEO is also the Chairman the agency cost are higher as the ability to supervise the CEO is reduced -the Entrenchment Theory. 8,90,107, xix This reduction in board oversight facilitates the pursuance of the CEO's agenda, 109 which may diverge from shareholders' goals and, so, negatively affect the performance of the firm. On the xviii The literature refers to the combination of the roles of CEO and Chairman of the board as CEO duality. So, CEO duality exists when a firm's CEO also serves as Chairman of the board of directors. xix Berger et al 108(p1411) 
define entrenchment "as the extent to which managers fail to experience discipline from the full range of corporate governance and control mechanisms, including monitoring by the board, the threat of dismissal or takeover, and stock-or compensation-based performance incentives."
other hand, advocates of the combination of the two roles defend that the choice of board leadership is based on the firm's economic and business environments so, joining both functions in the same individual may be best suited to a firm's conditions -the Efficiency Theory. 110, 111 In this sense, the features of an effective board will change as a function of environmental conditions. xx/xxi Accordingly, each firm weighs the costs and benefits related to both leadership structures and chooses the one that is best suited to its economic and business conditions. In 110 both leadership structures have costs and benefits and it is not theoretically obvious which of them is the best. In fact, the "optimal structure is likely to vary according to the economic circumstances facing the firm." 110(p218) 
Board experience and performance
The effectiveness of internal control mechanisms in any financial or nonfinancial institution relies, in great part, on the monitoring and advising abilities of its board of directors. There is a recent and increasing consensus that the strict and effective performance of both the monitoring and advisory roles depends on the experience of directors, 34, 45, 114 particularly from the point of view of risk management. 85 ,xxii A more financially knowledgeable board can identify risks that will not pay off or that are unsound for the financial stability and can advise senior managers to avoid such risks. 35 Alternatively, financial experts can recognise risks that are more beneficial to shareholders in normal times and incentive management to take on those risks. 35 This negative relationship is consistent with the results of Minton et al. 35 For a sample of US banks, they find that while financial expertise is weakly related to better performance before the crisis, it is strongly associated with lower performance during the crisis. Overall, the results are consistent with independent directors with financial expertise supporting increased risk taking prior to the crisis. xxv reduced as bank boards become more independent and is higher if the incoming executive is also appointed as CEO.
One possible explanation for the mixed findings as previously discussed in this sub-section is the use of different proxies for financial expertise.
27,73
Board education and performance
In addition to directors' banking experience, the qualifications of directors may influence bank performance, as a higher educational level leads to better judgments on a particular investment strategy and thus, to better corporate decisions. This is particularly important in the case of banking firms because the complexity of their activity often requires a great amount of specific knowledge. OECD Corporate 118 investigate how a set of characteristics of executives, such as educational composition, affect the portfolio risk of financial institutions. They remove all banks from the sample that were subject to regulatory interventions, capital support measures, and distress mergers to obtain a clean identification of the impact of changes in board composition on bank risk taking in a sample of banks that does not contain seriously troubled institutions. They find that when board changes increase the representation of executives holding a Ph.D degree the portfolio risk declines, suggesting that such executives apply better risk management techniques.
Board diversity and performance
The link between board diversity and shareholder value is relatively new, although there is literature since the 1990s that support expectations for improved performance and increased value for firms that implement diversity initiatives, thereby promoting action for managing diversity. 119, 120 Firms which encourage diversity can create competitive advantages in several dimensions of business performance: cost, attraction of human resources, marketing success, creativity and innovation, problem-solving quality and organisational flexibility. 119 Also, wider diversity in board member characteristics has been advocated as a means of improving organisational performance by providing boards with new insights and perspectives. 121 For Fields and Keys 122(p13) "a key factor in diversity's successful impact on firm performance is the value found in the heterogeneity of ideas,
experiences, and innovations that diverse individuals bring to the firm."
The rationale behind the view of diversity as a positive force within boards builds on the assumption that the existence of multiple and divergent viewpoints within a board will decrease the likelihood that the agenda and initiatives will be dominated by the CEO and his/her inside director allies, thus improving the monitoring role of the board. 123 Although board diversity has several dimensions the literature reveals a predominance of gender diversity.
Following the increased attention that gender diversity has received, boards around the world are under increasing pressure to choose female directors. In fact, many proposals for governance reform explicitly emphasise the importance of gender diversity on the board. The most prominent promotion of this kind of diversity took place in Norway, where since January 2008 all listed companies must abide by a 40%
gender quota for female directors or face dissolution. 124, 125 Most of the national legislative initiatives are based on the view that the presence of women on boards creates value. Female board directors provide unique perspectives, experiences, and work styles as opposed to their male counterparts, 126 which can greatly enhance deliberations of the board. These attributes will lead to better performance when combined with female characteristics such as communication and listening skills. 127 Likewise, Bart and McQueen 128 document that female directors can make significant contributions to the board due to their higher quality decision-making capability, which helps better explain the higher rates of return, more effective risk management and even lower rates of bankruptcy when women are present on the board. In addition, previous literature documents that female directors are in general better prepared than men for board meetings 129 and have better attendance records. female directorships and the performance of the firm. 18, [135] [136] [137] The research by Adams and Ferreira 124 shows that, although female directors are more effective than men in monitoring, the average effect of gender diversity on the performance of firms is negative.
In the light of the financial crisis, the link between performance and gender diversity has been raised and discussed publicly. Kristof 138 xxviii According to him, more diversity on boards of banks and other financial institutions, in particular more women, is not just one of better gender equality, but also one of better corporate governance. xxix In November 2012, the European Commission proposed legislation that forces publicly listed companies in all, at the time, 27 member states, with the exception of small and medium enterprises, to reserve at least 40% of their non-executive director board seats for women by 2020. However, this legislation aims to accelerate progress towards a better gender balance on the corporate boards and not, at least explicitly, corporate governance.
National culture has an important impact on executive mindsets, as demonstrated by the fact that executives of different cultural background are not equally open to change in organisational strategy and leadership profiles 142 and in the interpretation and response to strategic issues. 143 Group members drawn from various nationalities tend to differ in ways that have substantial implications for group functioning, since national culture has a significant effect on the outlook, perceptions and behaviour of individuals. 144 Masulis et al 145 Additionally, although no study analysing the relationship between age diversity and performance has been found, heterogeneity on age is neither significantly related to changes in corporate strategy 146 nor facilitates innovativeness. 
Board age and performance
An individual's age is expected to influence strategic decision-making perspectives and choices. 146 However, there are mixed views on how the average age of a director impacts agency conflicts and, consequently, the firm performance. 30 On the one hand, older directors have more knowledge and experience, which might facilitate effective monitoring and attenuate agency costs. 30 On the other hand, flexibility decreases and rigidity and resistance to change increase as people age. 146 Also, older directors might lack the incentive and energy to actively monitor managers, thereby increasing agency problems. 30 For Child 148 younger men are able to expend more physical and mental effort on promoting the change and growth of their firms. In this viewpoint, young board members will be more vigorous and provide greater continuity into the future than will older board members. 149 Also, lower managerial age is associated with both risktaking and strategic change, 146, 148 which seems to suggest that young managers are inclined to take risks at the expense of shareholders. On the other hand, younger managers are likely to have received their education more recently than older managers, so their technical knowledge should be superior 147 and they have more favourable attitudes toward risk-taking. 150 In this sense, younger aged boards are more likely to have the skills and cognitive resources needed to evaluate risk effectively as well as the willingness to take the risks that result in higher returns for shareholders.
Grove et al, 30 regarding US commercial banks, find that average director age value-destroying activities. Therefore, market investors react less favorably to the appointment of a young appointee because they predict that this appointment will impose additional agency costs to the bank. In addition, Berger et al 118 show that bank risk taking decreases as board age increases. This effect is statistically significant and also economically large.
Board busyness and performance
The literature disagrees on the link between the number of directorships held by board members and the performance of firms. Peyer, 155 Fich and Shivdasani, 156 Jackling and Johl, 157 Cashman et al 158 and Méndez et al 159 ) . Accordingly, Loderer and Peyer 155 document that seat accumulation is negatively related to the value of the firm, possibly because of the conflicts of interest that directors are exposed to when they serve on several boards simultaneously and the insufficient time they can dedicate to any one of multiple mandates. Likewise, Jackling and Johl 157 find evidence of a negative effect of busy outside directors on a firm's performance, suggesting that "busyness" did not add value in terms of networks and improvement of resource accessibility. Busy directors exhibit a higher tendency to be absent from board meetings 160 and are detrimental to the monitoring capability of the board and its committees. 159 In the financial crisis period, Francis et al 18 find that the number of directorships has no impact on the performance of non-financial firms.
Regarding the relationship between board busyness and bank performance, 
Board activity and performance
In the agency framework, the intensity of board activity, measured by the frequency of board meetings, may indicate an active monitoring role of corporate boards and so, influence corporate performance. Following this view, board meetings are beneficial to shareholders. Conger et al 161 suggest that board meeting time is an important mechanism in improving the effectiveness of boards. The higher the frequency of meetings, the greater the supervision of top management, indicating a more effective monitoring role, which might mitigate agency costs and subsequently improve the performance of the firm. 30 "The primary way in which directors obtain necessary information is by attending board meetings." 162(p227) An opposing view is that board meetings are not necessarily useful because, given their limited time, they cannot be used for the meaningful exchange of ideas among directors or with management. 90 Moreover, routine tasks absorb much of the meetings, thereby limiting opportunities for outside directors to meaningfully exercise control over management. 163 On the one hand, there are costs associated with board meetings, including managerial time, travel expenses and meeting fees of directors. On the other hand, there are benefits, including more time for directors to confer, define strategy and monitor management.
Andres and Vallelado 1 find explanations both for and against a positive relation between the frequency of meetings and the performance of banks. Meetings provide board members with the opportunity to come together to discuss and exchange ideas on how they intend to monitor managers and bank strategy. Therefore, the more frequent the meetings, the closer the control over managers, the more significant the advisory role, factors that lead to a positive impact on performance (proactive boards). Furthermore, the complexity of the banking business and the importance of information require a more active and effective advisory role by boards. Additionally, boards of banks tend to be larger and have more committees, which are required to meet more frequently in order to be effective. 12 However, frequent meetings might also be a result of the board's reaction to poor performance (reactive boards). 
Board characteristics and bank failures
To the best of our knowledge, almost no research has empirically examined the direct relationship between corporate governance attributes and the failures of banks. Bank failures during the crisis have shown that the body of knowledge about bank defaults is apparently still not sufficient to prevent large number of banks from failing. 164 Most research of bank defaults has focused on the impact of accounting variables, such as capital ratios (e.g. Martin, 165 Pettway and Sinkey, 166 Lane et al, 167 Espahbodi, 168 Cole and Gunther, 169, 170 Helwege, 171 Kolari et al, 172 Schaeck 173 and
Cole and White 174 ). Berger and Bouwman, 175 for example, examine how capital affects a bank´s performance (survival and market share) during both financial crises (including the recent crisis) and normal times. They conclude that having more capital increases the probability of survival of small banks at all times and of medium and large banks during banking crises.
Given the scarcity of research on the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on bank defaults, we chose in this sub-section, contrary to the previous one, to make a joint analysis of the impact of board characteristics on financial failures of banks and not to make an analysis of the influence of these characteristics one at a time.
Hambrick and D'Aveni 176(p1) characterise bankruptcy as a "protracted process of decline" and a "downward spiral". Therefore, substantial financial distress effects are incurred well prior to default. 177 The financial distress of banks in the wake of the recent financial crisis has triggered a discussion about the role of corporate governance structures in the stability of financial institutions. Nevertheless, the finding that corporate governance impacts on bank stability, emphasising bank risk-taking behaviour, was already found long before the recent financial crisis.
Regarding financial distress, for Simpson and Gleason, 178 using a sample of 287 banking firms for the period 1989-1993, board size and the percentage of insiders on the board do not impact on the future probability of financial distress, contrary to the CEO duality that has a significant effect. Specifically, CEO duality decreases the probability of financial distress five years later.
Concerning board characteristics and their influence on bank failures, Berger et al, 164 for a sample of US commercial banks during the period of 2007-2010, report that the number of outside directors, the number of chief officers, the number of other corporate insiders and the board size do not have influence on a bank's default probability, while the CEO duality has a negative impact one year and two years prior to default. Thus, they conclude that the management structure of a given bank is not decisive for its overall stability.
Conclusions
Banks remarkably differ from non-financial firms. Due to their particularities and their impact on the stability of the financial system and the overall economy, failures in bank governance are more critical than failures in unregulated nonfinancial firms governance. Thus, we examined how bank governance differs from governance in the other type of firms and how governance in banks is conditioned by their special attributes.
During the financial crisis the governance mechanisms gained significantly more importance especially concerning the effectiveness of the board of banks, being a topic of intense policy discussion. A bank's board plays a crucial role in achieving effective governance. Specifically, it is a key mechanism to supervise managers' behaviour and decisions and to advise them on strategy setting and implementation, providing critical resources to the firm (e.g., such as knowledge, networks and connections). The role of the board of directors takes on special importance in a framework of greater opacity and complexity, intense regulation and higher asymmetric information, that characterise banking activity.
Many academic, economists and policy documents have outlined recommendations about banks governance namely about the independence of the board of directors. The underlying idea is that numerous characteristics of the board impact on directors' incentives and ability to effectively carry out their duties and, consequently, have an impact on performance (and risk-taking). In addition, the effect of board characteristics on bank value depends on the trade-off between the advantages and disadvantages of monitoring and advising.
In this paper, we review the vast body of literature devoted to the relationship between bank board characteristics and bank performance, in the U.S. setting and in international settings (although most studies use data from US, which is more abundant) in the crisis and non-crisis periods. The survey suggests that some of the empirical findings commonly found in non-financial institutions (e.g. board independence and board size) do not hold for banking firms. Several studies show that board independence is not positively associated with bank performance. Independent directors are not (necessarily) beneficial for banks as they not always have the adequate knowledge about the specificities and complexity of the banking business.
Thus, the costs related to less satisfactory advice seem to outweigh the monitoring advantages of independent directors. Similarly, the positive link between board size and bank performance is not found in several studies. Although larger boards are advantageous because they increase the pool of expertise and resources available to banks, boards with too many members can lead to problems of coordination, control and flexibility in the decision-making process. Additionally, for instance, board experience is important for bank performance and positively related to it, as evidenced by the existing research. Also, the literature stresses that a widespread lack of financial expertise on the boards of a large number of banks appears to have played a significant role in the recent crisis. 
